![]() Owing to strict space and citation-count limits as well as to the unusually long (three-decade) span of material to be covered, research included here is exceedingly selective. We place emphasis on studies in the behavioral sciences, especially psychology (including all its subdisciplines), noting that a complementary review of studies emphasizing neuroscience appears in the Annual Review of Neuroscience (see Phelps et al. Our objective is to provide organizational structure to and critical analysis of the field. We examine theories and evidence from the nascent field of emotion and decision making, ranging from approximately 1970 until the present. Put succinctly, emotion and decision making go hand in hand. Regardless of whether the decisions are adaptive or not, once the outcomes of our decisions materialize, we typically feel new emotions (e.g., elation, surprise, and regret Coughlan & Connolly 2001, Mellers 2000, Zeelenberg et al. Similarly, decisions can serve as the conduit for increasing a negative emotion or decreasing a positive emotion, tendencies associated with mental illness. Decisions can be viewed as a conduit through which emotions guide everyday attempts at avoiding negative feelings (e.g., guilt and regret) and increasing positive feelings (e.g., pride and happiness), even when they do so without awareness (for reviews, see Keltner & Lerner 2010, Loewenstein & Lerner 2003). 2014, Keltner & Lerner 2010, Lazarus 1991, Loewenstein et al. Indeed, many psychological scientists now assume that emotions are, for better or worse, the dominant driver of most meaningful decisions in life (e.g., Ekman 2007, Frijda 1988, Gilbert 2006, Keltner et al. As shown in Figure 1, yearly scholarly papers on emotion and decision making doubled from 2004 to 2007 and again from 2007 to 2011, and increased by an order of magnitude as a proportion of all scholarly publications on “decision making” (already a quickly growing field) from 2001 to 2013. The supplement also includes primers on the respective fields of ( a) emotion and ( b) JDM.īut a veritable revolution in the science of emotion has begun. The online Supplemental Text for this article examines the curious history of scientific attention to emotion. Moreover, research examining emotion in all fields of psychology remained scant (for review, see Keltner & Lerner 2010). Even psychologists' critiques of expected utility theory focused primarily on understanding cognitive processes (see Kahneman & Tversky 1979). The case was similar in psychology for most of the twentieth century. ![]() In economics, the historically dominant discipline for research on decision theory, the role of emotion, or affect more generally, in decision making rarely appeared for most of the twentieth century, despite featuring prominently in influential eighteenth- and nineteenth-century economic treatises (for review, see Loewenstein & Lerner 2003). 2014), an increasingly vibrant quest to identify the effects of emotion on judgment and decision making (JDM) is under way. Across disciplines ranging from philosophy ( Solomon 1993) to neuroscience (e.g., Phelps et al. ![]() But as the quote above reveals, Simon knew his theory would be incomplete until the role of emotion was specified, thus presaging the critical attention contemporary science has begun to give emotion in decision research. ![]() Nobel laureate Herbert Simon (1967, 1983) launched a revolution in decision theory when he introduced bounded rationality, a concept that would require refining existing normative models of rational choice to include cognitive and situational constraints. Hence, in order to have anything like a complete theory of human rationality, we have to understand what role emotion plays in it.
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